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One who has occasion to make any considerable study of
the law of negotiable instruments in Ohio is struck with one
fact. There are many problems which have resulted in much
litigation and accumulation of authorities in other states and
upon which there is little or no case authority in Ohio. The
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law has been adopted in
every state as well as in the District of Columbia and the ter-
ritorial possessions.' Ohio was among the states which adopted
the law soon after its approval by the body now known as the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.2 The dearth of reported cases construing the statute is
not to be explained by the fact that it is new and untried. New
York adopted the law in 1897 only five years earlier than Ohio,
yet the former has approximately ten times as much case law
concerning it as has the latter.3
After puzzling over the question of why a great commercial
state such as Ohio should have so small a body of case law on
controversial points of the N.I.L. the writer has reached a
tentative conclusion.' It is probable that the cognovit or judg-
t Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
1 BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 1194.
2 The Negotiable Instruments Law was drafted by a Committee of the
National Conference of State Boards of Commissioners for Promoting Uni-
formity of Legislation in the United States appointed in 1895. The draft
was approved by the Conference in 1896 and adopted in Connecticut, Colo-
rado, New York and Florida in 1897. It was adopted in Ohio in x9oz, 95
O.L. 169 and became effective Jan. I, 1903. See Brannan op. cit. supra, note
I, at p. 1194.
' This is a rough approximation from the fact that Brannan's, N.I.L. (6th
ed. Beutel 1938) lists 740 cases from New York and 72 from Ohio. There
are duplications in the table of cases and hence the total number of cases is
less than the number just indicated for each state.
4 If any former student or reader can suggest anything which would shed
light either as confirming or casting doubt upon this tentative conclusion, it
will be appreciated.
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 141
ment note is more widely used in this state than in most others.
Statistics to support this belief are not available. It is true,
however, that in many states the warrant of attorney to confess
judgment is void and the cognovit note is not used at all.' It
is probable that such notes are used more frequently in some
parts of Ohio than in others. An examination of 1500 cases in
the Franklin County Common Pleas Court reveals that prac-
tically all negotiable instrument cases involve either cognovit
notes upon which judgment is taken by confession or notes
secured by real estate mortgage foreclosure of which is sought
in the same action with that on the note. It is not customary
for the latter notes to contain a warrant of attorney to confess
j udgment. The character of transaction out of which such notes
arise probably precludes many of the problems which have
been the subject of great controversy.' Eliminating the cases
involving foreclosure of real property mortgages the great bulk
of negotiable instrument litigation seems to involve cognovit
notes. While it is possible for a defendant to have a cognovit
I Note. Validity of lVarrant of Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment
(1938) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 585. Indiana has probably gone further than any
other state in attempting to discourage the use of cognovit notes. The legisla-
ture of that state in 1927 enacted two laws (Ch. 66, Acts of 1927) "An Act
entitled an act concerning contracts to pay money, making unlawful all con-
tracts and stipulations for the confession of judgments under powers of attor-
ney given before a cause of action to enforce judgment of money due therein
shall be accrued, or for the release of errors, or for giving consent to the issue
of execution under any powers of attorney so given." (Burns Ind. Stat. Ann.
2-2904 & 5).
Ch. 227 Acts of 1927, an Act entitled an act defining a cognovit note,
prohibiting their execution and procurement and fixing a penalty for viola-
tion thereof. (Bums Ind. Stat. Ann. 2-29o6). See Farabaugh and Arnold,
Conmentaries on the Public Acts of Indiana, 1927 III. The Cognovit Note
Act (1929) 5 Ind. L.J. 93 and Gavit, The Indiana Cognovit Note Statute
(I929) 5 Ind. L.J. 208. Ogden, Negotiability of Judgment Notes (1928)
3 Ind. L.J. 695.
Among other factors might be mentioned the following: (i) the loan
is usually for a long period, (z) the payee is generally a financial institution
vho ce business is that of lending money on such security rather than that of
discounting negotiable paper as a somewhat speculative business, (3) standard-
ized forms which have been carefully drawn to eliminate troublesome prob-
lems of construction are used.
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judgment vacated it seems to be infrequently done.' Matters
which are pleaded by way of answer or demurrer in other
jurisdictions, and which must be disposed of before judgment
is rendered, are unnoticed in the great mass of cases where
cognovit judgments are taken and remain unquestioned.
For the purpose of substantiating the thesis that many im-
portant negotiable instrument questions are as yet undecided in
Ohio it is proposed to discuss some of them in this article. This
is done with the further purpose of suggesting to Ohio lawyers
some of the leading authorities pro and con bearing upon such
questions.'
CHATTEL NOTES
It is quite common for notes, cognovit and otherwise, given
as part or all the purchase price of a machine or piece of equip-
ment to recite that fact and that tide thereto is to remain with
the seller until the note is paid. N.I.L. Section 3' provides:
"An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within
the meaning of this act, though coupled with; ... (2) A state-
ment of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument." In
view of this it is not surprising that most of the cases which have
involved the question of negotiability of a title retaining note
have held affirmatively.1" Seemingly the only reported cases
7 An article to be published in the JOURNAL in the near future will deal
with the various phases of the law of cognovit judgments. It is hoped that
data to support the statement in the text will be available for use in that article.
8 Still another purpose is that of eliciting from readers any helpful sug-
gestions or criticisms as mentioned at the end of this article.
I Ohio G.C. sec. 81o8.
10 BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th Ed. Beutel 1938) p. 155, 181.
Ann. Negotiahility of title retaining notes, 28 A.L.R. 699; 44 A.L.R.
1397-
Ann. Note for purchase price as conditional sale, 17 A.L.R. 1481; 9z
A.L.R. 335.
7 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. I9I et seq. p. 9oo.
io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 92, p. 540-
Bigelow, BILLS, NOTES & ClECKS (3rd ed. Lile 19z8) sec. 98, p. 61.
Daniel, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 56, p. 62.
Ogden, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ( 4th ed. 1938) sec. 64, p. 115.
Aigler, Conditions in Bills and Notes (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471.
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in Ohio are two circuit cases decided long before the adoption
of the statute and therefore of little aid on the question of its
construction."
ACCELERATION CLAUSES
N.I.L. Section 212 provides: "The sum payable is a sum
certain within the meaning of this act, although it is to be paid,
* • • (3) By stated installments, with a provision that upon
default in payment of any installment or of interest the whole
shall become due; . . ." There is no provision expressly cov-
ering the rather common form of note which recites that it is
secured by collateral, and that if the collateral depreciates in
value more will be furnished or the note will become immedi-
ately due or will do so at the option of the holder. The better
view would seem to be that such a clause does not impair nego-
tiability." However, there is a substantial body of opinion to
the opposite effect."
Richter, Are Chattel Notes Negotiable (1930) 5 Notre Dame Lawy. 172.
Titche, Is Negotiability Impaired by a Retention of Title (1933) 7 Tu-
lane L. Rev. 607.
Notes. (1922) 1I Cal. L. Rev. 37; (1927) oo Cent. L. Jour. 136;
(x93z) 31 Mich. L. Rev. z7z; (1927) z 5 Mich. L. Rev. 668; (1923) 71
U. Pa. L. Rev. 167.
11 29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 87, after stating that there is
a diversity of opinion, says, "The question is not settled in Ohio," and cites
only Mansfield Sav. Bk. v. Miller, 2 Ohio C.C. 96, i Ohio C.D. 383 (1887
Aff. W.O. 53 Ohio St. 666; 44 N.E. 1142 (1895) and Mansfield Say. Bk. v.
Floxers, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. x69, ii Ohio L. Bull. 141 (1881). Both cases
held the notes to be negotiable.
"' Ohio G.C. sec. 8107.
13 BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 170, iSo.
Ann. Acceleration provisions as affecting negotiability, 34 A.L.R. 872;
72 A.L.R. z68.
Ann. Effect on note of acceleration of mortgage securing note, 34 A.L.R.
848; 5 6 A.L.R. 185.
Ann. Validity of provision accelerating maturity of obligations as affected
by rule against contracts in restraint of trade, 96 A.L.R. I 130.
Ann. Duty of creditor to apply funds so as to prevent operation of accel-
eration clause, 8o A.L.R. 246.
8 Am. jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 158 et seq. p. 878.
Io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 98 et seq. p. 548.
BIGELOxv, BILLS, NOTES & CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 143, P. 90.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 54,
p. 56.
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CONSENT TO EXTENSION OF TIME
It is not uncommon for instruments otherwise negotiable
to contain a clause permitting the extension of time of payment
without loss of rights against the parties. N.I.L. Section 5"=
provides: "An instrument which contains an order or promise
to do any act in addition to the payment of money is not nego-
tiable. But the negotiabl character of an instrument otherwise
negotiable is not affected by a provision which: ... (3) Waives
the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection
of the obliger; . .. " The purpose of a clause permitting ex-
tension of time is to waive the benefit of the rule of suretyship
law which is codified in N.I.L. Section I2o" "A party second-
arily liable on the instrument is discharged ... (6) By any
agreement binding upon the holder to extent the time of pay-
ment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instru-
OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1938) sec. 54, P. 77.
Aigler, Time Certainty in Negotiable Paper (1929) 77 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 313.
Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev.
747-
Gilligan, Acceleration Clauses in Notes and Mortgages (1939) 88 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 94.
Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the N.I.L.
(1929) 3 8 Yale L. J. 1047.
Waddell, Acceleration Clauses and Negotiability (1925) II Va. L. Rev.
129.
Notes. (1932) 2o Cal. L.Rev. 329; (1931) i 9 Cal.L.Rev. 525; (1919)
7 Cal. L. Rev. 263; (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 430; (933) 8 Ind. L. Jour.
550; (1927) 13 Iowa L. Rev. 98; (1929) 15 Iowa L. Rev. 94; (1933) 31
Mich. L. Rev. 983; (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 272; (1932) 30 Mich. L.
Rev. 789; (1931) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 924; (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 710;
(1932) i6 Minn. L. Rev. 302; (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 308; (933) 11
Tenn. L. Rev. 282; (933) 7 U. Cin. L. Rev. 334; (939) 17 Tex. L.
Rev. 199; (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 921.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 81 discusses the problem and
cites only Ashland B. & L. Co. v. Kerman, 23 Ohio App. 127, 155 N.E. 245;
4 Ohio L. Abs. 646 (1926) motion to certify record overruled in 25 Ohio L.
Rep. 96, holding acceleration clause in note does not prevent it from being
negotiable.
1 See authorities cited in note 13, supra.
'-Ohio G.C. sec. 811o.
"I Ohio G.C. sec. 8225.
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ment, unless made with the consent of the party secondarily
liable, or unless the right of recourse against such party is ex-
pressly reserved." The great majority of cases have upheld the
negotiability of instruments containing such provisions." How-
ever, there is a minority view."
BURDEN OF PROOF OF CONSIDERATION
N.I.L. Section 240 provides that "Every negotiable in-
strument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valu-
able consideration; and every person whose signature appears
thereon to have become a party thereto for value" and Section
2821 "Absence or failure of consideration is matter of defense
as against any person not a holder in due course; and partial
failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto which the failure
is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise." It seems
rather obvious that want of consideration and failure of con-
sideration are put in the same category and that burden of proof
of either would rest upon the defendant alleging it. This is
the view taken by most of the cases which have given any atten-
tion to the above sections." Ginn v. DolcaW2 is frequently cited
17 BMRNNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 185.
Ann. Negotiability As Affected by Provisions for Extension. of Time, 77
A.L.R. io85.
7 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 15 x et seq., p. 874.
Io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 99 et seq., p. 554.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ( 7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 57,
p. 64.
Notes: (1935) 15 Bost. U.L. Rev. 297; (1918) 3 Corn. L.Q. iz5;
(19z8) 3 Ind. L.J. 397; (x926) I Ind. L.J. zo6; (1918) 4 Iowa L.
Bull. 123; (19z9) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 458, 477; (1928) z6 Mich. L. Rev.
568; (19z3) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 927; (935) 9 Tul. L. Rev. 461; (I9z9)
77 U. Pa. L. Rev. OZ.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 82 discusses the problem but
cites no Ohio cases.
"' See authorities cited in note 17, supra.
"'Ohio G.C. sec. 8 1 z9.
' Ohio G.C. sec. 8 133.
,1 BRANNAN's, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 363.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. i8o,
p. 220.
Ann. Burden of Proof As to Lack or Failure of Consideration When Plain-
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for the opposite view and it is true that the Ohio Supreme
Court in that case distinguished between want and failure of
consideration and held that the burden of proof, where want of
consideration was alleged, rested upon the plaintiff. Several
inferior court cases in recent years have taken the same view
citing Ginn v. Dolan.2 However, it has been pointed out in a
well reasoned common pleas court case24 that the note involved
in Ginn v. Dolan was executed prior to the effective date of
the N.I.L. and Section 195" "The provisions of this act do not
apply to negotiable instruments made and delivered prior to
the passage hereof." This probably accounts for the absence of
any reference to the pertinent provisions of the N.I.L. in the
opinion in Ginn v. Dolan. It seems quite probable that when
occasion arises the court will fall in line with the majority view
that the burden of proof rests upon the defendant.
BANK CREDIT AS VALUE
In England and in Canada where the holder of an instru-
ment deposits it with his bank and is credited with the amount
the bank thereby becomes a holder for value.26 The prevailing
tiff Not Protected As Holder in Due Course, 35 A.L.R. 1370; 65 A.L.R. 904.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 1005 et seq., p. 594.
I IC.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 655b, p. 75.
Danforth, Burden of Proof of an Issue of Want of Consideration under
the N.I.L. (1923) 96 Cent. L.J. 350.
Kent, Want of Consideration and Value in Negotiable Instruments (1926)
3 Wis. L. Rev. 32.
Notes. (I925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 98; (i937) z6 Ill. B.J. 71; (1931) I6
Iowa L. Rev. 553; (1925) 29 Law Notes (N.Y.) 83; (940) 38 Mich. L.
Rev. 399; (i939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 95o; (1925) 23 Mich. L. Rev. 793;
(925) 9 Minn. L. Rev. 280; (i9z6) 35 Yale L.J. 369.
22 81 Ohio St. Ii, 90 N.E. 141, I35 Am. St. Rep. 761, i8 Ann. Cas.
204 (1909).
23 29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 6o8. Three recent court of
appeals cases cited in the supplement are: Sharick v. Szefeyk, 17 Ohio L. Abs.
332 (i934); Schardt v. Schardt, 17 Ohio L. Abs. i85 (1934), and St. John
v. St. John, ?3 Ohio L. Abs. 290 (i937). Motion to certify overruled March
17, 1937.24 Miller Rubber Prod. Co. v. Noll, 3o Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 305 (933).
25 Ohio G.C. sec. 8299.
2' Royal Bank v. Tottenham (1894) 2 Q.B. 715; Capital & Counties
Bank v. Gordon (1903) A.C. 240; Ex parte Richdale (i882) 19 Ch. D.
409; Bank of British N.A. v. Warren (i909) 19 Ont. L. Rep. 257; 6 A.L.R.
253-
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rule in this country is to the contrary.27 It is generally held that
the bank must have actually honored withdrawals by the de-
positor which tapped that particular deposit before it can be
regarded as a holder for value." The question would ordinarily
arise where there is a personal defense to an action on the de-
posited instrument and the bank is claiming immunity from
such defense by reason of being a holder in due course. Of
course if the depositor or some prior holder were a holder in
due course, N.I.L. Section 582" would give adequate protection
to the bank. It provides ". ..But a holder who derives his
title through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has
all the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties
prior to the latter." Where some previous holder gave value
27, Ann. Crediting the Proceeds of Negotiable Paper to Holder's Deposit
Account as Constituting Bank as Holder in Due Course, 6 A.L.R. 252; 24
A.L.R. 901; 6o A.L.R. 247 and 8o A.L.R. lO64.
BRANNAN's, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 375 states that this is the
majority rule but on p. 376 criticizes the rules and cites a number of recent
cases which "have reached the proper result that mere crediting the account
is value."
Ann. Crediting Amount to Depositor's Account as Precluding Recovery
Back of Money Paid to Bank by Mistake, 25 A.L.R. 129.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 187, p. 960.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 442, p. 191.
Io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 3 16 b, p. 803.
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES & CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile) sec. 477, P. 367.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ( 7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 899,
P. 951.
Baker, Bank Deposits & Collections (1912) 11 Mich. L. Rev. 122.
Frye, Crediting an Account as Value (1924) z Wis. L. Rev. 408.
Moore, Susman & Corstvet, Drawing against Uncollected Checks (1935)
45 Yale L.J. 260.
Townsend, Bank Deposits of Commercial Paper (929) 7 N.Y.U.L.R.
292, 618.
Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper As Purchases (1928) 37 Yale L.J.
874.
Comment, Value in the Transfer of Negotiable Instruments (1924) 33
Yale L.J. 628.
Notes: (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 351; (1928) 27 Mich. L. Rev. IOO;
(1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 703; (1923) 7 Minn. L. Rev. 583; (1929) 6
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 318; (1923) 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 61; (1921) 69 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 378.
28 See note 27, supra.
2' Ohio G. C. ,ec. 8163.
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but was not a holder in due course it would seem that the bank
having the other qualifications set out in N.I.L. Section 520"
might claim to be a holder in due course by virtue of N.I.L.
Section 26"' "Where value has at any time been given for the
instrument, the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect
to all parties who became such prior to that time." For some
reason this possibility has escaped the attention of the courts
dealing with the bank credit question.32
RULE IN CLAYTON'S CASE
In connection with the question of determining whether a
bank has become a holder for value by reason of permitting
withdrawals there is frequently difficulty arising from a suc-
cession of deposits and withdrawals. Some courts have held
that the amount represented by the deposited item has never
been withdrawn if the depositor's account has been continuously
larger than it was prior to that particular deposit because of
subsequent deposits."3 The more common view, however, is
that which applies the rule in Clayton's Case3" that "first
money in is first money out" or that first debits are to be charged
against first credits."
30 Ohio G.C. sec. 8157.
3' Ohio G.C. sec. 813 1.
32 See Hunter, Holders for Value of Negotiable Instruments (1937) 22
Il. L. Rev. 287.
" Nat. Bk. of Commerce v. Morgan, 207 Ala. 65, 9z So. 10, 24 A.L.R.
897; American Surety Co. v. Ind. Say. Bk., 242 Mich. 581, zi9 N.W. 689,
z7 Mich. L. Rev. 100 (1928) and annotations in A.L.R. cited supra note 27.
34 (I816) 1 Mer. 572.
35 9 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 187, p. 961. No Ohio cases
cited.
BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 383.
Ann. Crediting the Proceeds of Negotiable Paper to Holder's Deposit Ac-
count As Constituting Bank a Holder in Due Course, 6 A.L.R. 25z; 24 A.L.R.
90l; 6o A.L.R. z47 and 8o A.L.R. 1O64.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 443, P. 194.
Io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 316 b, p. 8o6.
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 19z8) sec. 489,
477, P- 368.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7 th ed. Lile Calvert 1933) sec.
899, p. 953-
Comment, First Money in Is First Money Out (1936) lO U. Cin. L.
Rev. 278.
Notes: (1932) 26 111. L. Rev. 579; (1921) 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378.
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COLLATERAL SECURITY FOR PRE-EXISTING DEBT
N.I.L. Section 25" provides "Value is any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-
existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the
instrument is payable on demand or at future time." Even
prior to the statute it was generally held that a negotiable
instrument taken as payment of a pre-existing debt was taken for
value although there would have been no consideration in such
a transaction involving a non-negotiable contract."7 However,
where the instrument was taken merely as collateral security
for a pre-existing debt there were two lines of authorities prior
to the statute."" The so-called federal rule originated with
Swift v. Tyson.3" The obsequies for the holding that there
could be a distinct federal rule were read in the case of Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins."' Under the rule of the latter case the fed-
eral courts would have been bound in Swift v. Tyson to follow
the New York rule as found in Bay v. Coddington."  The
latter case held that one taking an instrument as collateral
" Ohio G.C. sec. 8130.
:" BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 489,
p. 383.
BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 391. Indicating some doubt.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 209,
p. 262.
"" BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3 rd ed. Lile I928) sec. 489,
p. 383.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ( 7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 900,
p. 956.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 195, p. 967.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 440, p. 188.
xo C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 3 18, p. 809.
.9 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I, io L. Ed. 865 (1842).
4°304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
Bowman, The Unwonstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson (1938)
18 Bost. U.L. Rev. 659.
McCormick & Hewens, The Collapse of "Gemeral" Law in the Federal
Courts (1938) 33 111. L.R. 126.
Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 Yale L.J. 1336.
Notes. (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 263; (1938) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 1312;
(1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 885; (1938) I Temp. L. Quart. 486; (1938)
86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 896; (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 895.
41 (18z1) 5 Johns, Ch. 54.
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security for a pre-existing debt did not qualify as a holder for
value and did not take in due course. Prior to the statute many
of the state courts followed the New York rule. 2 However,
most courts including those of New York have finally con-
cluded that the statute is intended to codify the former federal
rule. 3 N.I.L. Section 27"' makes this seem the more certain.
"Where the holder has a lien on the instrument, arising either
from contract or by implication of law, he is deemed a holder
for value to the extent of his lien."
ASSIGNMENT AND GUARANTY
The holder of an instrument sometimes writes over his sig-
nature a statement which departs from the usual forms and
therefore raises questions. "I assign the within note," signed
by the holder is illustrative. First there is the question: Is it
an indorsement so as to permit the assignee to be regarded as
a holder in due course? The weight of authority favors an
affirmative answer.4" A court of appeals in Ohio has taken the
minority view.4" A second question sometimes arises, i.e. grant-
42 See note 3 8, suPra.
" See authorities cited in note 38, supra.
Ann. Taking Negotiable Paper As Collateral Security for Pre-existing In-
debtedness As Sustaining One's Character As Holder in Due Course under the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, 8o A.L.R. 670.
Notes. (1922) 22 Col. L.R. 279; (1938) 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 397.
44 Ohio G.C. sec. 81 32.
45 BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 474, P. 479.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 320, p. 55.
1o C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 2o8 b, p. 695.
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 256,
p. 184.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 764,
P. 793.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 185, p. 959.
Ann. Effect of Assignment Indorsed on the Back of Commercial Paper,
4 4 A.L.R. 1353.
Arant, The Written Aspect of Indorsement (1924) 34 Yale L.J. 144.
Notes: (93) i Cal. L. Rev. 324; (1933) 8 St. John's L. Rev. 129;
(1929) 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 225; (1936) I Wis. L. Rev. 4o6.
46 Carius v. Ohio Contract Purchase Co., 30 Ohio App. 57, 164 N.E. 234
(1928).
Note. (929) 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 225.
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ing it is an indorsement, is it a qualified indorsement? In view
of the definition of a qualified indorsement this question is a
natural one. N.I.L. Section 3 8" provides "A qualified indorse-
ment constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the
instrument. It may be made by adding to the indorser's signa-
ture the words 'without recourse' or any words of similar im-
port. Such an indorsement does not impair the negotiable
character of the instrument." Perhaps the weight of authority
favors the view that the "assignment type of indorsement is
unqualified, but there are many cases holding it to be qualified."
Similarly two questions may arise in connection with a
guaranty placed on the back of a negotiable instrument. By the
better view such a guaranty is an indorsement and the transferee
may qualify as a holder in due course if he has the other quali-
fications." The guarantor is generally deemed to have waived
47 Ohio G.C. see. 8143.
"I BRANNAN's, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 495.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ( 7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 784,
p. 813.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 32o, p. 55.
1o C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 214 b. (3) P. 703.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 16i, p. 941, citing Lenhart v.
Ramey, 3 Ohio C.C. 135, z Ohio C.D. 77, Aff. W.O. 24 Ohio L. Bull. 428
(1888).
Ann. Effect of Assignment Indorsed on the Back of Commercial Paper,
44 A.L.R. 1353.
Arant, The Written Aspect of Indorsement (1924) 34 Yale L.J. 144.
Notes. (1938) 8 Detroit L. Rev. 39; (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 483;
(I933) 8 St. John's L. Rev. 129; (1938) 12 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1I; (936)
I \ Wis. L. Rev. 4o6.
• BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 475 and p. 479.
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 256,
p. 184.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 1582,
p. i628.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 320, p. 56.
io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 2o9, p. 696.
Ann. Indorsement of Bill or Notes in Form of Guaranty as Transferring
Title, 21 A.L.R. 1375; 33 A.L.R. 97; 46 A.L.R. i516.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 184, p. 958, citing no Ohio
cases.
Arant, The Written Aspect of Indorsement (1924) 34 Yale L.J. 144.
Notes. (1924) 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 296; (934) 8 Tul. L. Rev. 6o2;
(i935) ,o Wis. L. Rev. 294.
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presentment and notice of dishonor since some effect should be
given his words and that effect is consistent with a guaranty."
PAYEE AS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
One of the most hotly contested questions arising under the
N.I.L. is that as to whether a payee may be a holder in due
course." Of course the only situation in which the question can
50 29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 37Z, p. II 6.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7 th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 1582,
p. I628.
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 256, p.
185; at sec. 457, P. 352, the author states that if the guarantor is "held to be
an indorser he is of course entitled to all of an indorser's rights, including
presentment and notice," but he cites no authorities.
" BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 543.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 374, P. I 12.
IO C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 305, p. 789.
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 523, p.
416, note 4.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ( 7th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 884,
p. 929.
OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4 th ed. 1938) sec. 158 a, p. 265.
Ann. Payee as Holder in Due Course under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, 15 A.L.R. 437; 21 A.L.R. 1365; 26 A.L.R. 769; 32 A.L.R. 289; 68
A.L.R. 962; 97 A.L.R. 1215. These annotations take the view that the
payee cannot be a holder in due course.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 18o, p. 955, takes the same
view but the only Ohio case which has mentioned the problem did not in-
volve in and the statement is dictum. In Burke v. Jenkins, 128 Ohio St. 86
(1934) at p. 94 Judge Allen's opinion quotes from an Iowa case to the effect
that a payee may not be a holder in due course.
Aigler, Payee as Holders in Due Course (1927) 36 Yale L.J. 6o8.
Beutel, Rights of a Remitter (1928) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 584.
Britton, Payee as Holder in Due Course (1934) I U. Chi. L. Rev. 728.
Feezer, May the Payee of a Negotiable Instrument be a Holder in Due
Course (1925) 9 Minn. L. Rev. IOI.
Goodwin, Payees as Holders in Due Course (1938) 7 Ford. L.Q. 9o .
Hamilton, Holder in Due Course (1912) 24 Jur. Rev. 41.
Henning, The Uniform N.I.L. Is it Producing Uniformity and Cer-
tainty in the Law Merchant? (19 11) 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 471.
Notes. (1922) 1o Cal. L. Rev. 413; (i9z6) 15 Geo. L.J. 82; (1932)
46 Harv. L. Rev. 151; (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 751; (1917) 3o Harv. L.
Rev. 515; (1928) 22 IlI. L. Rev. 765; (1923) 18 Ill. L. Rev. 47; (1932)
30 Mich. L. Rev. 456; (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 591; (1922) 20 Mich. L.
Rev. 9o8; (1922) 6 Minn. L. Rev. 4o6; (930) 2 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. z4;
(1933) 7 S. Cal. L. Rev. 115; (1934) 8 U. Cin. L. Rev. 547; (1926) 74
U. Pa. L. Rev. 831; (1921) 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 52; 0935) 21 Va. L. Rev.
707; (1922) I Wis. L. Rev. 421; (1927) 36 Yale L.J. ioo5.
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arise or be of any consequence is one in which an intermediary
has dealt with the drawer or maker on the one hand and the
payee on the other and has attempted to work a fraud on both.
Prior to the statute there was nothing in such a situation to
prevent the payee who took for value in good faith, before
maturity and without notice a complete and regular instrument
payable to his order, from qualifying as a holder in due course.
However, it is held in many cases that certain words in sections
14, i6, 30, 52 and 191 preclude the result that a payee may
ever be a holder in due course."2 The better view would seem
to be that which harmonizes the result under the statute with
that which was reached prior to the statute since there was no
announced intention of changing the established rule.a
THE DOCTRINE OF PRICE V. NEAL
In Price v. Neal" Lord Mansfield held that a drawee who
had paid two bills of exchange on which the drawer's signa-
ture had been forged could not recover the money from a
holder for value to whom the payment had been made. The
rule came to be stated as one to the effect that the drawee is
bound to know the drawer's signature." However, some courts
in this country recognized exceptions to the rule in cases where
the holder had been guilty of negligence in failing to disclose
the forgery to the drawee before payment." The N.I.L. does
not expressly cover the question of the right of the drawee to
recover money paid out on a forged draft or check. However,
Section 62" is generally regarded as codifying the doctrine of
Price v. Aeal. "The acceptor by accepting the instrument en-
52 "Negotiated" in secs. 5 and 14 and as defined in sec. 3o, "immediate
parties" in sec. 16 and the definitions of "holder" and "issue" in sec. 191.
5' This is the view taken in practically all the law review articles cited in
note 51, sucra.
3 Burr. 1354 (1762).
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 192,
p. 127.
"' BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 195,
p. 130.
" Ohio G.C. sec. 8167.
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gages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his accept-
ance5 and admits
(i) the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his
signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instru-
ment; . . ."
While acceptance and payment are not synonymous and
have many distinguishing features this section is cited when
a drawee endeavors to recover money mistakenly paid on a
forged check or bill." The question has been frequently raised
whether Section 6- in codifying the doctrine of Price v. Neal
must be taken as carrying along the equitable exceptions based
upon negligence or bad faith or whether the failure to provide
for them has terminated them. The more prevalent view seems
to be that the exceptions are to be read into Section 62 in those
jurisdictions where they were recognized prior to the statute.09
BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 761.
9 BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 196,
p. 131.
BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 769.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. Calvert 1933) sec. 1613,
p. 1656.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 857, p. 499.
io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. 467 b, p. 1013.
OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1938) sec. 182, p. 321.
29 0. Jur. "Negotiable Instruments" sec. 473, P. 1182.
Ann. Right of Drawee of Forged Check or Draft to Recover Money Paid
Thereon, 3 A.L.R. 627; Iz A.L.R. 1089; 33 A.L.R. 499; 71 A.L.R. 337.
Ann. Drawee Bank's Certification of Check as an Admission of Genuine-
ness of Drawer's signature, Iio A.L.R. 11o9.
Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 809.
Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1891) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297.
Cooper, Forgery, Price v. Neal (1929) 8 Ore. L. Rev. 872.
Woodward, The Risk of Forgery or Alterdtion of Negotiable Instruments
(1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 469.
Notes. (1926) 99 Cent. L. Jour. 2; (934) 38 Dick. L. Rev. 197;
(1917) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 304; (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 680; (1925) 20
I11. L. Rev. 160; (1932) 26 Ill. L. Rev. 818; (1924) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 277;
(1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 456; (1928) 27 Mich. L. Rev. IOO; (192o) IS
Mich. L. Rev. 790; (1928) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 879; (1930) 14 Minn. L.
Rev. 283; (1932) 17 St. L.L. Rev. 273; (1929) 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. io6;
(1938) I2 U. Cin. L. Rev. 74; (1922) 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1Z5; (1920) 7
Va. L. Rev. 73; (1921) 30 Yale L.J. 296; (192o) z9 Yale L.J. 921.
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CERTIFICATION OF ALTERED CHECK
In the absence of statute it was usually held that a drawee
bank which had certified and paid a check, the amount of which
had been fraudulently raised prior to certification, could recover
the excess over the original amount as money paid under mis-
take of fact." Some cases"i have held this result improper under
the N.I.L. in view of the language of Section 62 quoted above,
"The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will
pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance." To reach this
result it is necessary to give this sentence the following mean-
ing: "The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that
he will pay it according to its tenor at the time of his accept-
ance." 2 If no other meaning can be given to the words actually
used this may be a justifiable construction. However, a schol-
arly treatise has pointed out that the words without any addi-
tion or change have a definite meaning as used in the section."
It is recalled that an acceptance under other sections of the law
may be any one of several kinds, general,64 qualified" or for
honor." The phrase "according to the tenor of his acceptance"
is intended then to indicate that the acceptor is to be liable
according to the kind of acceptance which he has chosen to sign.
Since N.I.L. Section 1 32 7 states that "The acceptance of a bill
is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of
the drawer," it is suggested that the drawee bank in certifying
"' BIGELOW, BILLS, NoTEs AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 197,
p. 132.
BRANNAN's, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 773.
WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) sec. 80, p. 126.
" Wells Fargo Bk. v. Bk. of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P. (2d) 781 (931);
Nat. City Bk. of Chi. v. Nat. Bk., 300 IMI. 103, 132 N.E. 832, 22 A.L.R.
1153 (1921).
" See Wells Fargo Bk. v. Bk. of Italy, 214 Cal. 156 (supra note 59) at
p. 165.
"' BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3rd ed. Lile 1928) sec. 197 a,
p. 134, note 2.
64 N.I.L. sec. 139; Ohio G.C. sec. 8244.
6 MSd.
C N.I.L. sec. 161; Ohio G.C. sec. 6266.
07 Ohio G.C. sec. 8z37.
156 LAW JOURNAL- MARCH, 1940
is assenting to the actual order of the drawer. Under this reas-
oning it would be allowed to recover the amount fraudulently
added which it had been induced to pay under a mistake of
fact. 8 However, logical this result may be from an accurate
analysis of the provisions of the N.I.L. it is submitted that the
rule placing the loss upon the certifying bank is preferable from
the viewpoint of social policy." In all these situations where
one of two innocent parties must suffer, that rule is to be
desired which throws the loss where it may be most easily
absorbed and where it will have the result of minimizing simi-
lar losses in the future. From both angles it is better to place
the loss upon the certifying bank. It is more feasible for it to
carry insurance to cover such losses and thus cause the shock
to be absorbed by a large number of similar institutions each
contributing premiums to constitute a fund for the purpose. It
is coming to be a relatively simple matter for banks to equip
68 On the general problem see:
BRANNAN'S, N.I.L. (6th ed. Beutel 1938) p. 774.
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ( 7 th ed. Calvert I933) sec. I866,
p. 191z.
8 Am. Jur. "Bills and Notes" sec. 859, p. 503.
io C.J.S. "Bills and Notes" sec. I83a, p. 676.
MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1938) sec. 266, p. 470.
Beasley, Liability of Drawee Bank where a Check or Bill has been Ma-
terially Altered before Payment (1932) i0 Tenn. L. Rev. 87.
Greeley, The Effect of Acceptance of an Altered Bill (933) 27 111.
L. Rev. 519.
Steffen and Starr, A Blueprint for the Certified Check (1935) 13 N.
Car. L. Rev. 45o.
Notes. (1931) 19 Cal. L. Rev. zo; (I9zz) 22 Col. L. Rev. 26o;
(922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 749; (19Z?) I6 Ill. L. Rev. 615; (I933) 31
Mich. L. Rev. 4o8; (I93I) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 5o3; (I9zz) 6 Minn. L.
Rev. 405; (1932) 4 Rocky Mt. L.R. 2z4; (i93i) 4 S. Cal. L. Rev. 238;
(93) 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 492; (1922) 31 Yale L.J. 522.
'9 "Under the Geneva Uniform Law of Bills and Notes (C. 36o, M. 151,
1930 II) it is provided by Art. 69 that, 'In case of alteration of the text of
a bill of exchange, parties who have signed subsequent to the alteration are
bound according to the terms of the altered text; parties who signed before the
alteration are bound according to the terms of the original text.' The same
rule is adopted in the Geneva Uniform Cheque Law (C. 294) M. 137, 1931
II B. Art. 5 I."
STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER (939)
p. 446.
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their paying teller and certified check cages with ultraviolet
light which will facilitate the discovery of the alteration before
certification or payment is made. It is reported that banks on
the continent are using such lights as regular equipment.
Perhaps enough troublesome problems of the Negotiable
Instruments Law have been mentioned to prove the point that
the Ohio case law is strangely deficient in this area. The last
two problems are not such as would be affected by the use or
non use of cognovit notes. As to the others if the anesthetizing
effect of the cognovit note is not the explanatory factor the
writer would like to have a more satisfactory answer suggested.
